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Why Does This River Flow? In re Cooper and the Continued
Prohibition of Contingency Fees in Divorce Actions
Small streams make mighty rivers. This characteristic of nature seems to
apply in some circumstances to the creation of legal rules and doctrine. In the
area of family law, for example, courts give special recognition and protection to
the institution of marriage.1 At the same time they treat suspiciously all attor-
ney fee arrangements by which the attorney receives as compensation a percent-
age of the amount recovered. 2 The convergence of these two unrelated judicial
aims has resulted in a prohibition against the use of contingency fee arrange-
ments in divorce actions. This formidable prohibition is rarely questioned and
exists in all but one state.3
In the recent decision of In re Cooper 4 the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals continued the ban on contingency fee contracts for legal services rendered
in divorce actions. This Note examines the court's analysis of policy considera-
tions supporting the ban and focuses on the court's decision to allow the fee
arrangement in equitable distribution cases while maintaining the ban in divorce
cases. It concludes that the Cooper court correctly found unpersuasive two
traditional policy considerations supporting a prohibition against contingency
fee arrangements-preventing attorneys from meddling in the parties' reconcili-
ation efforts and preventing attorneys from overreaching and charging excessive
fees. This Note, however, criticizes the court for giving continued deference to a
rule of law that has outlived the conditions under which it was created.
David Cooper instituted divorce proceedings against Mary Ann Cooper on
December 1, 1982.5 On December 28 Ms. Cooper employed legal counsel and
signed a contract of employment in which she agreed to pay her attorney, Rob-
ert Karney, a fee of thirty-five percent of the gross recovery in addition to ex-
penses.6 After Ms. Cooper responded to her husband's complaint, the trial
court entered a judgment of divorce on January 24, 1983, and by January 12,
1984, the court entered a final judgment on the distribution of marital property.7
When she defaulted on her payment of fees, Ms. Cooper's attorney instituted
foreclosure proceedings on a promissory note she had signed.8 Ms. Cooper re-
1. See infra text accompanying notes 30-32.
2. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
4. 81 N.C. App. 27, 344 S.E.2d 27 (1986).
5. Id. at 27, 344 S.E.2d at 28.
6. Id. at 27-28, 344 S.E.2d at 28. The contract stipulated as follows:
This is to acknowledge that I have retained the services of Robert A. Karney, P.A., as legal
counsel to represent me in the matter of: David E. Cooper vs. Mary Ann Cooper. The
agreed attorney's fee to Robert A. Karney, P.A., for their representation in this matter is as
follows: Thirty-five percent of the gross recovery plus expenses.
Id.
7. Id. at 28, 344 S.E.2d at 28. Ms. Cooper's answer admitted all the allegations in her hus-
band's complaint and counterclaimed for equitable distribution of their marital property under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
8. Id. The agreed upon fee was $6,790, to be paid according to an installment plan. Ms.
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sponded by making a motion for permanent injunction against the foreclosure.9
Finding the amount of the fee contingent upon both the Coopers' divorce and
the value of the equitable distribution recovery, the trial court permanently en-
joined the foreclosure and ordered the note cancelled. It based its order on a
recent decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which held that contin-
gent fee contracts in divorce cases were contrary to public policy. 10 The trial
court therefore concluded that Ms. Cooper's contingency fee contract was
void.1 ' The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
that the contract was void because the fee was contingent on securing a divorce.
It concluded, however, that a contingency fee arrangement in an equitable distri-
bution proceeding would not, in itself, violate public policy. 12
In rejecting the argument that contracts for fees contingent upon the
amount of equitable distribution were void, the court of appeals analyzed its
prior decision in the divorce case of Thompson v. Thompson 13 and focused on
the application of Thompson's policy arguments to equitable distribution pro-
ceedings. First, in discussing whether contingency fees promote divorce by plac-
ing attorneys in a position to discourage reconciliation, 14 the Cooper court noted
that this theory has come under increasing attack.' 5 Although questioning the
continued validity of this justification, the Cooper court was bound by its prior
decision in Thompson that contingency fee arrangements in divorce proceedings
violate public policy.16 With respect to equitable distribution, however, the
court distinguished Thompson by noting that because the divorce was already
secured in equitable distribution cases, no opportunity existed for meddling in
the parties' reconciliation efforts. 17
Cooper signed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust to her distributed property. She made
only one payment prior to default.
9. Id. A temporary restraining order was served on the trustee to suspend the foreclosure sale
until the hearing on the permanent injunction could be held.
10. Thompson v. Thompson, 70 N.C. App. 147, 319 S.E.2d 315 (1984), rev'd on other grounds,
313 N.C. 313, 328 S.E.2d 288 (1985).
11. Cooper, 81 N.C. App. at 29, 344 S.E.2d at 29.
12. Id.
13. 70 N.C. App. 147, 319 S.E.2d 315 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 313 N.C. 313, 328 S.E.2d
288 (1985).
14. The term "reconciliation" in this context refers to a termination of the divorce proceeding.
This meaning should not be confused with the term's use in the identification of alimony obligations,
in which the North Carolina Supreme Court considers one act of sexual intercourse between the
parties to constitute a reconciliation. See Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 397, 245 S.E.2d 693,
698 (1978).
15. The Cooper court stated: "'Indeed, [the rationale that contingent fees promote divorce]
reflects a jaundiced view of human motivation. Under this view of human nature one can just as
easily argue that a contingent fee promotes reconciliation, because a client would be tempted to
reconcile to avoid paying the contingent fee'." Cooper, 81 N.C. App. at 31, 344 S.E.2d at 30 (quot-
ing Comment, Professional Responsibility-Contingent Fees in Domestic Relations Actions: Equal
Freedom to Contract for the Domestic Relations Bar, 62 N.C.L. REv. 381, 387 (1984)); see infra note
58 and accompanying text; see also G. LEVINGER & 0. MOLES, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION 251(1979) (making reference to attorneys employed on hourly rate contracts: "There are some lawyers
who want to litigate .... They get better fees that way-the taxicab with the meter running.").
16. Cooper, 81 N.C. App. at 31, 344 S.E.2d at 30.
17. Id. This attempt to preserve precedent was ineffective. The Thompson court stated, "[A]
contract for the payment of a fee to an attorney contingent in amount upon his procuring a divorce
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Second, the Cooper court focused on the argument that contingent fees are
unnecessary in domestic relations cases because statutes provide for court-
awarded fees.18 It noted that statutory fees are provided only in unique situa-
tions in equitable distribution proceedings. 19 Thus, the court determined that
this concern also would not apply to equitable distribution cases.20
Last, the Cooper court examined the policy argument that the ban prevents
attorneys from overreaching and charging excessive fees.21 It concluded that
the potential impact of these problems is weakened because the North Carolina
Rules of Professional Conduct 22 prohibit such conduct by attorneys and because
the laws of the state guard specifically against unreasonable contingency fee con-
tracts.23 Although conceding that clients in domestic cases often are emotion-
ally vulnerable, the court noted that such contracts are allowed in other actions,
such as wrongful death, in which the clients are equally distraught, if not more
SO.
2 4
In summary, the Cooper court found that the policy arguments against con-
tingency fee arrangements either collapsed under careful examination or simply
did not apply to equitable distribution cases. By implication, the court also
questioned the very bases of the Thompson decision. Nevertheless, the court
elected to adhere to the traditional rule in divorce actions.
To understand the Cooper decision it is necessary to examine its historical
context. In the past, courts viewed contingency fee contracts unfavorably; at
common law such contracts were illegal. 25 Contingency fees in general still
come under attack for producing spurious litigation.26 In divorce cases they
have been held void in every state except Texas,27 and the Model Rules of Pro-
for his client or contingent in amount upon the amount of alimony and/or property awarded is void as
against public policy." Thompson, 70 N.C. App. at 157, 319 S.E.2d at 320 (emphasis added).
18. Cooper, 81 N.C. App. at 32, 344 S.E.2d at 31.
19. The relevant statute provides:
Upon application by the owner of separate property which was removed from the marital
home or possession of its owner by the other spouse, the court may enter an order for
reasonable counsel fees ... but such fees shall not exceed the fair market value of the
separate property at the time it was removed.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(i) (Supp. 1985).
20. Cooper, 81 N.C. App. at 32, 344 S.E.2d at 31.
21. Id. at 32-39, 344 S.E.2d at 31-34.
22. The pertinent rule states: "A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or col-
lect an illegal or clearly excessive fee." The comment to the rule adds: "All fees, including contin-
gent fees, should be reasonable and not excessive as to percentage or amount." N.C. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.6(A) and comment (1985).
23. "'Contracts for contingent fees, especially, are closely scrutinized by the courts where there
is any question as to their reasonableness.'" Cooper, 81 N.C. App. at 35, 344 S.E.2d at 32 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Randolph v. Schuyler, 284 N.C. 496, 504, 201 S.E.2d 833, 837-38 (1974)).
24. Id. at 39, 344 S.E.2d at 34.
25. 1 AM. JUR. TRIALS Setting the Fee § 16 (1964). See generally Comment, supra note 15, at
385 (contingent fee arrangements were still considered champertous). Champerty was an agreement
between an individual with a cause of action and a third person who agreed to fund the suit in return
for a portion of the proceeds if the litigation was successful. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (5th
ed. 1979).
26. See DuBois, Modify the Contingent Fee System, 71 A.B.A. J. 38, 40 (December 1985).
27. 1 AM. JUR. TRIALS Setting the Fee § 49 (1964); see, ag., McConnell v. McConnell, 98 Ark.
193, 136 SW. 931 (1911); Newman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 P. 907 (1900); McCarthy v.
1380 [Vol. 65
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fessional Conduct specifically identify domestic relation proceedings as an area
in which contingency fee contracts are forbidden. 28 The primary recurring rea-
son advanced for prohibiting contingency fee contracts in divorce cases dates
back to the earliest opinions: "Such a situation involves the personal interest of
the attorney in preventing a reconciliation between the parties."'29
Although North Carolina had not specifically addressed the issue of contin-
gency contracts in divorce proceedings prior to 1984, the courts have looked
"with disfavor upon an agreement which will encourage or bring about a de-
struction of the home."'30 As early as 1913 in Pierce v. Cobb31 the supreme
court stated, "If the object of a contract is to divorce man and wife, the agree-
ment is against public policy and void."'32
In 1984 the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Thompson v. Thompson 33
joined the vast majority of courts and held that any fee arrangement contingent
upon securing a divorce violates public policy.34 Relying almost exclusively on
the decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals in Barelli v. Levin,35 the Thompson
court adopted the view that such contracts would promote divorce and interfere
with reconciliation, and furthermore that they were unnecessary. The 1969
Barelli opinion relied heavily on turn-of-the-century cases as authority for the
proposition that contingency fee contracts promote divorce and therefore are
void.36
Many courts have cited Jordan v. Westerman 37 to support the argument
that contingency fee contracts discourage reconciliation.3 8 This 1886 case in-
Santangelo, 137 Conn. 410, 78 A.2d 240 (1951); Evans v. Hartley, 57 Ga. App. 598, 196 S.E. 273(1938); Dannenberg v. Dannenberg, 151 Kan. 600, 100 P.2d 667 (1940); Coleman v. Sisson, 71
Mont. 435, 230 P. 582 (1924); Van Vleck v. Van Vleck, 21 A.D. 272, 47 N.Y.S. 470 (1897); see also
In re Smith, 42 Wash. 2d 188, 195, 254 P.2d 464, 468 (1953) (court deemed prohibition against
contingency fees in divorce actions an "almost universal rule").
28. "A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect: (1) any fee in a
domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a
divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d) (1983). The Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, which the Model Rules superseded, did not contain a specific prohibition in the disciplinary
rules, but did address the issue: "Because of the human relationships involved and the unique char-
acter of the proceedings, contingent fee arrangements in domestic relation cases are rarely justified."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (1980); cf. N.C. RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.6 (1985) (rule mentions contingency fee contracts in criminal and civil
context, with no specific reference to domestic cases).
29. In re Sylvester's Estate, 195 Iowa 1329, 1333, 192 N.W. 442, 443 (1923) (citing Newman v.
Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 P. 907 (1900)).
30. Matthews v. Matthews, 2 N.C. App. 143, 147, 162 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1968).
31. 161 N.C. 300, 77 S.E. 350 (1913).
32. Id. at 302, 77 S.E. at 351.
33. 70 N.C. App. 147, 319 S.E.2d 315 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 313 N.C. 313, 328 S.E.2d
288 (1985).
34. Id. at 157, 319 S.E.2d at 322.
35. 144 Ind. App. 576, 247 N.E.2d 847 (1969).
36. The three cases on which the Barelli court relied were Jordan v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170,
28 N.W. 826 (1886); McConnell v. McConnell, 98 Ark. 193, 198, 136 S.W. 931, 933 (1911) (citing
Jordan); and Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J. Eq. 736, 758, 52 A. 694, 702 (1902) (citing Jordan for proposi-
tion that contingency fee contracts promote divorce).
37. 62 Mich. 170, 28 N.W. 826 (1886).
38. See, eg., McConnell v. McConnell, 98 Ark. 193, 198, 136 S.W. 931, 933 (1911); Barelli v.
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volved an attorney who would not tell a husband where his wife was living be-
cause the husband wanted to mend the torn relationship. The attorney admitted
that he intended to obtain as large a fee as possible and stated that it was against
his best interest to have the couple reconcile.39 The opinion primarily discussed
the nature of alimony and the impact of allowing the wife to contract away her
alimony before it was awarded to her.4° The court did not reach the issue of the
contract's viability, relying instead on the premise that married women lacked
capacity to contract.4 1 The court further stated that families should not be dis-
integrated for unworthy motives and that the facts supported the conclusion
that the attorney's motives were indeed unworthy.42
With Jordan and Barelli as its preceptor, the court of appeals in Thompson
determined that contingency fee contracts promote divorce and offend the state's
public policy. Thompson was appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court on
the issue of whether the attorneys should have been allowed to intervene in Ms.
Thompson's suit against her husband.4 3 The court noted that "review of that
decision [voiding all contingency fee contracts in domestic cases] has not been
sought and therefore the validity of that decision is not before us."'44 One com-
mentator speculated that had the supreme court disagreed with the court of
appeals' decision, it would have taken the opportunity to overturn that court's
ruling, even though the validity of the ban on contingency fee contracts had not
been challenged. 45
The Cooper court's failure to set aside the holding in Thompson conformed
with the weight of existing authority. Paradoxically, however, the court recog-
nized the invalidity of most policy arguments supporting a ban on contingency
fee contracts. In spite of that recognition, it refused to overrule Thompson and
extend the use of contingency fee contracts to divorce cases.
This refusal is especially perplexing because divorce has lost much of the
stigma that it possessed when courts first imposed the ban on contingency fees in
Levin, 144 Ind. App. 576, 247 N.E.2d 847 (1969); In re Sylvester's Estate, 195 Iowa 1329, 192 N.W.
442 (1923); Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N.J. Eq. 736, 758, 52 A. 694, 702 (1902).
39. Jordan, 62 Mich. at 174-75, 28 N.W. at 828.
40. Id. at 178-80, 28 N.W. at 829-830.
41. Id. at 177, 28 N.W. at 829. The theory that married women lacked capacity to enter into
contracts was derived from feudal England. Upon a woman's marriage, her personal property and
possessions came under the control of her husband. In exchange for his protection and guardian-
ship, she lost all capacity to enter into contracts unless she was contracting as her husband's agent.
By the end of the 19th century, all of the state legislatures had enacted statutes to eliminate the
married woman's disability. Courts, however, were reluctant to give up their protection of married
women. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 219-28 (1968).
A paternal attitude toward married women can be identified in the Barelli opinion, in which the
court characterized "the occasional frustration of a wife unable to employ the attorney of her
choice" as "a small price to pay for the social advantages inherent in judicial control of wives'
attorneys' divorce fees." 144 Ind. App. at 590, 247 N.E.2d at 854.
42. Jordan, 62 Mich. at 180, 28 N.W. at 830.
43. Thompson, 313 N.C. at 313, 328 S.E.2d at 288. The trial court allowed Ms. Thompson's
former attorneys to intervene and file a complaint against her for the value of the services they had
rendered under a contingent fee contract before their discharge. Id. at 313, 328 S.E.2d at 289.
44. Id. at 314, 328 S.E.2d at 290.
45. Note, The Contingent Fee Contract in Domestic Relations Cases-Thompson v. Thompson,
7 CAMPBELL L. REV. 427, 448 (1985).
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domestic cases.4 6 The report of a New Jersey reconciliation committee that
analogized divorce to cancer illustrates the negative attitude that still existed
toward divorce in 1956. "Eventually, unless the [number of divorces] is checked
or excised before it metastasizes, the end result is the same [as in cancer]-
destruction."47
Functional changes reflect today's attitudinal changes: society has exper-
ienced an increase in the private ordering of the marriage relationship and a
decrease in the role of the state.4 8 The status of postnuptial agreements provides
a helpful analogy. In the past, postnuptial agreements made while a couple still
lived together were voided by North Carolina courts in the belief that the con-
tracts encouraged the destruction of the home.49 This view came to an end in
1984 when the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that state public
policy permits spouses to execute a property settlement at any time.
50
Another indicator of the state's decreasing role in regulating marriage is the
court's shifting focus to the aftermath of divorce rather than its causes.51 The
North Carolina Court of Appeals in Mayer v. Mayer 5 2 noted that the passage of
North Carolina's no-fault divorce statute represented a concession by the gen-
eral assembly to societal acceptance of divorce.5 3 One author who studied the
effect of another state's similar concession estimated that during the first year
the no-fault divorce legislation was in effect, the number of divorces increased
forty percent over the previous year. 54 Succinctly stated, the state's "regulation
of marriage... is a secondary consideration 'that comes up incidentally in distri-
bution and adjudication of rights to private property.' ',55 The notion that a
contingency fee contract promotes divorce fails to consider the current legisla-
tive attitudes toward marital dissolution. This Note does not purport to assert,
as did one commentator, that the state's interest in promoting marriage is out-
moded;56 instead, these observations point out that the state's reaction to di-
46. See generally Clark, Estoppel Against Jurisdictional Attack on Decrees of Divorce, 70 YALE
L.J. 45, 53-54 (1960) (Nineteenth century divorce viewed as a social evil that was tolerated in very
few circumstances).
47. COMMITTEE ON RECONCILIATION, REPORT TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT 1
(Feb. 14, 1956) [hereinafter REPORT] (emphasis added).
48. See Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv.
663, 665 (1976); Note, Gross v. Gross: Ohio's First Step Toward Allowing Private Ordering of the
Marital Relationship, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 235, 235 (1986).
49. Matthews v. Matthews, 2 N.C. App. 143, 147, 162 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1968) (citing Archbel
v. Archbell, 158 N.C. 408, 74 S.E. 327 (1912)).
50. Buffington v. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. 483, 488, 317 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1984); accord In re
Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976).
51. See Garrison, Marriage: The Status of Contract (Book Review), 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1039,
1060 (1983).
52. 66 N.C. App. 522, 311 S.E.2d 659, disc. rev. denied, 50 N.C. 260, 321 S.E.2d 140 (1984).
53. See id. at 529 n.3, 311 S.E.2d at 665 n.3.
54. W. JOHNSON, MARITAL DISSOLUTION AND THE ADOPTION OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE LEG-
ISLATION 63 (1975). Prior to the passage of North Carolina's no-fault statute, "deaths accounted for
a larger proportion of dissolved North Carolina marriages than did divorces." P. CAMPBELL, MAR-
RIAGES AND DISSOLUTIONS OF MARRIAGES, NORTH CAROLINA 1970-1980 18 (1981).
55. Book Note, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 499, 504 (1984) (quoting W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, AMERI-
CAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION 353 (1983)).
56. See Garrison, supra note 51, at 1049 (arguing the state's interests are outdated due to social
and economic changes).
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vorce has changed and that it recognizes that a marriage between two spouses
who " 'can't get along' is not worth preserving."
57
Although a change in attitude toward divorce has resulted in a reorienta-
tion of the state's role, two of the original policy rationales supporting the ban
on contingency fee arrangements were never valid. The Cooper court properly
questioned whether contingency fee contracts induce attorneys to discourage
reconciliation: "We also note that attorneys who do fall within this category
would also discourage reconciliation under a fixed-rate hourly-fee contract; after
all, a reconciled divorce requires fewer billable hours than a divorce drawn out
through the litigation process." 58
Regarding the issue of attorneys discouraging reconciliation, the revealing
question is not attorney motivation but whether and to what extent attorneys
have an opportunity to interfere with reconciliation. No statistics have reported
the percentage of attorneys who have interfered with their clients' reconciliation
efforts. Statistics are available, however, from those states 59 that attempted
mandatory reconciliation counseling. Such data provides insight into the oppor-
tunities for reconciliation once divorce proceedings are initiated. New York leg-
islators, for example, were dismayed at the failure of their reconciliation
counseling program which produced success rates of only one to five percent.6°
California, on the other hand, reported a twenty-four percent success rate.6 1
The California figures were compiled in 1954,62 when society frowned on di-
vorce, and most likely reflect this fact. California's reconciliation success rate
was also affected by the courts' use of contempt citations 63 to enforce the recon-
ciliation agreements. While this explains a higher success rate, the willingness of
a majority of the parties to face contempt charges rather than reconcile is partic-
ularly telling.
Another factor to consider in analyzing the opportunity for attorneys with
contingency fee contracts to interfere with reconciliation is the impact of no-
fault divorce procedures. In North Carolina the primary method" of obtaining
57. Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 105, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973).
58. Cooper, 81 N.C. App. at 31, 344 S.E.2d at 30. It should be noted that a difference does exist
between receiving fees for 10 hours (instead of the expected 20) based on an hourly rate and receiv-
ing nothing based on a contingency fee arrangement. However, the court clearly indicated that any
financial incentive would not be limited to attorneys on contingency fee contracts.
59. California and New York are two jurisdictions that retained statistical data in connection
with reconciliation counseling programs. A number of other states such as Illinois and New Jersey
have also commissioned studies on the feasibility of mandatory reconciliation counseling. See W.
JOHNSON, supra note 54; REPORT, supra note 47.
60, L. HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM 261 (1980).
61. REPORT, supra note 47, at 14.
62. Id.
63. L. HALEM, supra note 60, at 249.
64. An optional method of obtaining an absolute divorce exists:
In all cases where a husband and wife have lived separate and apart for three consecutive
years, without cohabitation, and are still so living separate and apart by reason of the
incurable insanity of one of them, the court may grant a decree of absolute divorce upon
the petition of the sane spouse.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5.1 (1984).
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an absolute divorce is based on a statutorily mandated separation period.65 This
period protects against hasty and emotional decisions and provides time for the
parties to attempt reconciliation while they wait for their cause of action to ac-
crue.66 In addition, it is noteworthy that more than ninety percent of all di-
vorces are uncontested. 67 Taken in sum, these facts demonstrate that by the
time the vast majority of couples seek legal counsel, they have determined that
dissolution of the marriage is in their best interests. The policy argument that
attorneys may occupy a position to discourage reconciliation fails to recognize
that their opportunities for interference are at best minimal. As the Cooper
court commented, "we question whether contingent-fee contracts do, in fact,
promote divorce or discourage reconciliation."'6 8 Obviously, the same court that
wrote the opinion in Thompson no longer agreed that this concern still consti-
tutes a valid reason for prohibiting contingency fee contracts in divorce
proceedings. 69
The Thompson court advanced a second major policy consideration in
prohibiting the contingency fee contract-namely, that statutory fees are avail-
able in domestic relations cases so that contingent fees are unnecessary. Never-
theless, the Cooper court found that this argument would not apply to the
equitable distribution portion of the case.70 The Cooper court failed, however, to
discuss the impact of statutory fees on the issue of the divorce proceeding. Be-
cause statutory fees are available for dependent spouses in divorce, alimony, and
child custody and support cases, 71 the court therefore implicitly accepted the
premise in Thompson that statutory fees make contingency fee contracts unnec-
essary because they assure both spouses equal access to the courts. 72
Statutory fees are not available, however, to all spouses who cannot afford
representation. As Judge Arnold of the North Carolina Court of Appeals em-
phasized, "a finding that a spouse is unemployed and has no income is not suffi-
65. The statute was amended in 1983 to exclude all other bases for divorce except N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-5.1 (1984). See supra note 64. The amended statute reads: "Marriages may be dissolved
and the parties thereto divorced from the bonds of matrimony on the application of either party, if
and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for one year...." Id. § 50-6. During
the period 1970-1980, 99% of the divorces in North Carolina were based on one-year separations. P.
CAMPBELL, supra note 54, at 20.
66. Mayer v. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. 522, 529, 311 S.E.2d 659, 665, disc. rev. denied, 50 N.C. 760,
321 S.E.2d 140 (1984).
67. L. HALEM, supra note 60, at 271.
68. Cooper, 81 N.C. App. at 31, 344 S.E.2d at 30. Arguably, North Carolina's rule from Mur-
phy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978), has a much greater tendency to prevent
reconciliation. See supra note 14.
69. The three judges in Thompson were Johnson, Hill, and Hedrick. The three judges in Cooper
were Becton, Parker, and Hedrick. In both cases, none of the judges dissented from the majority
opinion on the void status of contingency fee contracts in divorce actions.
70. Cooper, 81 N.C. App. at 32, 344 S.E.2d at 31.
71. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.6 (1984) (providing for counsel fees in an action or proceed-
ing for support or custody of a minor child if interested party acted in good faith and could not
afford suit); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.4 (1984) (providing reasonable attorney's fees for a dependent
spouse in action for absolute divorce, divorce from bed and board, annulment, or alimony without
divorce if spouse is entitled to alimony pendente lite).
72. Thompson, 70 N.C. App. at 156, 319 S.E.2d at 321.
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cient; there must be a finding of dependency on the other spouse." 73 Practicing
family law attorneys are quick to point out the tenuous aspect of statutory fees:
"Attorney fees are by no means 'guaranteed' in this state. Without specific and
complete findings of fact, appellate courts give little pause in overturning fee
awards."'74 A further point illustrating the inadequacy of statutory fees as a sole
source of attorney payment is the observation, made by one commentator, that a
court order requiring one of the spouses to pay for the other's legal expenses
does little good when both spouses are indigent. 75 In such cases, a critic of
contingency fee contracts might argue that attorneys would not willingly repre-
sent the dependent spouse because the res developed from the marital property
would be insignificant. Although true in some cases, this argument alone does
not support an absolute bar against the contingency fee contract. The court still
could provide an additional fee alternative for other clients who could not afford
an hourly fee but who are not classified as dependent spouses.
76
Even when a spouse carries a dependency status, many attorneys view the
statutory fees as inadequate: "[B]eware of looking to the spouse through court
order. Even if the supporting spouse is able to pay, the ordered amount will be
inadequate to support your handling the case.... [Y]our practice will probably
not be able to economically survive on a diet of court ordered fees."'77 Part of
the practicing attorney's distrust of court-awarded fees arises because the trial
judge sets the fee, which can be overturned on appeal only by demonstrating an
abuse of discretion.78
The North Carolina Supreme Court case of Owensby v. Owensby79 provides
an excellent illustration of why this fee system so disturbs the family law practi-
tioner. At trial the attorneys for the dependent spouse filed detailed affidavits of
the amount of work hours amassed during the representation. The attorneys
requested approximately 55,152 dollars for their fee and the trial court awarded
6,750 dollars for their efforts.80 The court of appeals found the 48,402 dollars
disparity to be a clear sign of the trial judge's abuse of discretion and further
stated that "[t]he inadequacy of such a fee shocks the conscience."81 The
supreme court, however, refused to accept the appellate court's ruling that the
73. Arnold, Award of Counsel Fees in Domestic Relations, in N.C. ACADEMY OF TRIAL LAW-
YERS-FAMILY LAW 2 (1979).
74. Marshall, Attorney Fee Orders, in DRAFTING DOMESTIC AGREEMENTS AND ORDERS IX,
IX-l (1986).
75. Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REv. 579, 636 (1984).
76. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(3) (1984) (defining dependent spouse as "a spouse, whether
husband or wife, who is actually substantially dependent upon the other spouse for his or her main-
tenance and support or is substantially in need of maintenance and support from the other spouse.").
In addition to dependency status, the spouse must demonstrate insufficient means to pay for the
lawsuit to obtain attorney's fees. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3(2), -16.4 (1984). See supra text accom-
panying note 73.
77. Baker, Setting Fees-Practice Tips, in NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE HAND-
BOOK 287, 292 (1984).
78. Rickert v. Rickert, 282 N.C. 373, 379, 193 S.E.2d 79, 83 (1972).
79. 312 N.C. 473, 322 S.E.2d 772 (1984).
80. Owensby v. Owensby, 68 N.C. App. 436, 437, 315 S.E.2d 86, 87, remanded by 312 N.C.
473, 322 S.E.2d 772 (1984).
81. Id. at 440, 315 S.E.2d at 88-89.
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fee demonstrated an abuse of discretion and remanded the case to the trial
court.82 It is quite understandable that practicing attorneys would find it wise to
establish a "pay your own way" relationship with the dependent spouse even
though the statutory fees exist and the size of the marital estate is
considerable. 83
The reluctance of many attorneys to rely on statutory fees for their compen-
sation demonstrates other flaws in the argument that statutory fees make contin-
gency fee contracts unnecessary. Inadequate reimbursement through statutory
fees may lead to a reluctance of attorneys to represent clients. This phenomenon
has occurred in other areas of litigation that provide the statutory fees. 84 This
reluctance also, predictably, forces the spouse who cannot afford high-priced
hourly rates to accept less experienced and less successful attorneys.8 5 Further-
more, the mere availability of statutory fees in other civil actions has not pro-
duced a bar against contingency fee contracts in those areas of litigation.86
The Cooper court curiously failed to discuss the impact of the availability of
statutory fees in divorce cases. It seemingly blinded itself to the interrelatedness
of the issues under consideration-namely, whether a contingency fee arrange-
ment to secure a client's divorce and equitable property settlement violated the
state's public policy.8 7 One possible explanation for the court's analytical failure
was its awareness of the obvious implication of undermining the only remaining
policy consideration upon which Thompson was based.
The Cooper court noted that in some domestic cases, specifically in child
support cases, 88 a contingency fee contract may affect the judicial determination
of the proper maintenance amount awarded. 89 The court failed to address this
concern with respect to divorce cases. In its discussion of the equitable distribu-
tion proceeding, however, the court was satisfied that notification to the trial
judge of any disruption of alimony caused by the fee could be a basis for future
modification of the awarded alimony and that "there will be no disruption of the
court-determined future support award." 90
The final policy consideration in Thompson centered on the prevention of
overreaching and excessive fees. The Cooper court noted that, unlike the statu-
82. 312 N.C. at 477, 322 S.E.2d at 775.
83. See Lewis, Setting Fees, in N.C. ACADEMY OF TRIAL LAWYERS-FAMILY LAW 9-11
(1983).
84. See, eg., Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L.
REv. 474, 612-13 (1985) (effects of inadequate statutory fees on legal aid and judicare programs).
85. See Saltzman, Private Bar Delivery of Civil Legal Services to the Poor: A Design for a Com-
bined Private Attorney and Staffed Office Delivery System, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1165, 1171 (1983).
86. In Hamner v. Rios, 769 F.2d 1404, 1406-08 (9th Cir. 1985), the court discussed the pres-
ence of statutory fees and contingency fee contracts in civil rights cases and held that the presence of
one should not bar use of the other, if the contingency fee contract was reasonable.
87. Cooper, 81 N.C. App. at 41, 344 S.E.2d at 35. "The trial court specifically found that Mr.
Karney's services in securing a divorce for Ms. Cooper were pursuant to the contingent-fee con-
tract." Id.
88. See Davis v. Taylor, 81 N.C. App. 42, 47, 344 S.E.2d 19, 23 (1986) (court banned contin-
gency fee contracts in child support proceedings).
89. Cooper, 81 N.C. App. at 37, 344 S.E.2d at 33.
90. Id. at 37-38, 344 S.E.2d at 34.
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tory fees issue, this concern applied equally to contingency fee arrangements in
equitable distribution and divorce proceedings. 9 1 It dismissed the argument that
the arrangement might result in excessive fees, because simply declaring contin-
gent fee contracts void "would not solve the problem of excessive charges for
legal services. '" 92 The court found the concerns of attorney overreaching equally
unpersuasive in light of the procedural safeguards against such behavior and the
close scrutiny contingency fee contracts receive from the courts. 93 Again the
Cooper court found that another of the Thompson policy considerations no
longer presented a valid reason for prohibiting contingency fee contracts in
either an equitable distribution proceeding or a divorce proceeding.
The Cooper court, in considering the potential harmful effects of contin-
gency fee contracts, found the notion that such contracts promote divorce and
interfere with reconciliation questionable, the effects on alimony correctable, and
the fear of attorney overreaching and charging excessive fees unpersuasive.
Thus, it upheld the validity of such contracts in equitable distribution proceed-
ings. Nevertheless, it held that because the fee in Cooper was also contingent on
securing a divorce, the contract was void under Thompson as against public
policy. 94
Aside from the opinion's inconsistent conclusion, the consequences of the
Cooper decision are undesirable. On one hand the court opened the door to
contingency contracts in equitable distribution proceedings; on the other hand it
required a fiction in their application. "[Clients] must execute a separate agree-
ment to provide for a fee in the divorce action that is not contingent upon the
securing of the divorce," while at the same time they can sign a contingency fee
contract for the equitable distribution proceeding.9 5 Although the court pointed
out that the decree of divorce must precede the actual equitable distribution,96
the North Carolina statute on equitable distribution directs the parties to file
their action prior to divorce or risk losing their rights.97 It is therefore impossi-
ble in the majority of cases98 for attorneys to keep their actions from overlapping
during the divorce proceedings. 99
For that very reason a New York ethics committee rejected a bifurcated fee
91. Id. at 32, 344 S.E.2d at 31.
92. Id. at 36, 344 S.E.2d at 33.
93. Id. at 39, 344 S.E.2d at 34-35.
94. Id. at 41, 344 S.E.2d at 36.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 31, 344 S.E.2d at 30.
97. "An absolute divorce obtained within this State shall destroy the right of a spouse to an
equitable distribution of the marital property under G.S. 50-20 unless the right is asserted prior to
judgment of absolute divorce." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11(e) (1984).
98. The right will not be destroyed if process was served on the spouse by publication, the
spouse failed to appear, and subsequently files the action for equitable distribution within six months
of the date of the divorce judgment. Id.
99. The court highlighted this inconsistency in a footnote. Cooper, 81 N.C. App. at 31-32 n.2,
344 S.E.2d at 30 n.2. Following a suggestion by the court that attorneys who represent clients in
both proceedings "may decide to offer only fixed-fee contracts in all cases," the court, as if to extri-
cate itself from the morass, stated, "[t]his, we believe, is the result of Thompson." Id. at 32, 344
S.E.2d at 30.
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arrangement, deciding that awards for alimony and awards for equitable distri-
bution were too intertwined.l ° ° The Indiana Court of Appeals also decided
against such a fee arrangement in a divorce and property division case because
the court viewed the two proceedings as a continuation of the same action. 10 1
By continuing to hold that contingency fee contracts in all divorce proceedings
are void, the Cooper court produced an undesirable and unnecessary fee situa-
tion for domestic relations clients and their attorneys.
The decision in Cooper invokes a mixed reaction. The court's analysis of
the major policy considerations-protecting marriage as an institution and
preventing contingency fee contract abuses-properly resulted in a lifting of the
ban on contingency fee contracts in equitable distribution proceedings. The
Cooper court, however, failed to take the opportunity to overrule its previous
blanket prohibition of contingency fee contracts in divorce proceedings. In-
stead, the court adopted an ungainly requirement that in divorce actions clients
pay their attorneys on a flat fee basis while in the property settlement proceeding
they may pay on a contingent fee basis.
The only policy consideration the court left intact was the availability of
statutory fees in divorce cases. The court readily admitted that the other policy
considerations collapse under careful study. The statutory fee argument is by
itself insufficient to justify total denial to either spouse of an additional contin-
gency fee arrangement, which may provide the only means for obtaining the
attorney of his or her choice. Although the Cooper court failed to follow the
analysis through to its proper conclusion and remove the ban on contingency fee
contracts in divorce cases, it must be given credit for revealing that the once
formidable rule is suffering from a drought of support.
CARL RAY GRANTHAM, JR.
100. See N.Y. County Lawyers Association--Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 660 (1984).
101. Meyers v. Handlon, 479 N.E.2d 106, 111-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
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